What insights does the export control of rare earths and lithium battery equipment bring to the photovoltaic equipment industry? | Overseas Expansion
Source | Gan Tan Hao Technology
Recently, the video "Turning Earth into Swords, Bringing Order out of Chaos: The Glorious but Complex 80 Years of China's Rare Earth Industry" mentioned that the supply-side reform in the rare earth industry and the crackdown on trade laundering have strong reference significance for the current anti-involution efforts in the photovoltaic industry.
There was a time when the rare earth industry was in a state of chaos where "anyone could mine and anyone could sell." Resources were dumped at low prices, smuggling was rampant, and order was out of control. This once put this industry, which is crucial to the country's strategic security, on the verge of collapse. Ten years later, China rebuilt the rules through a tough supply-side reform: from resource extraction to separation and smelting, from environmental permits to export controls, with restrictions at every level and tightening at every step. The rare earth industry has finally transformed from "selling soil" to "forging swords."
The transformation of the rare earth industry from chaos to order fully demonstrates that China is not short of resources but once lacked the systems; it is not lacking in capabilities but once lacked pricing power. The experience and lessons of the rare earth industry prove that strategic resources can only generate real national competitiveness under proper control.
Currently, photovoltaic products are also being sold in a similar way to "selling soil," with internal competition spilling over and causing losses and criticism. Fortunately, the "brother" of photovoltaics in the new energy track - the lithium battery industry - is about to see a turnaround.
Just last week, China officially included some lithium battery manufacturing equipment in the scope of export control. An announcement jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs listed key equipment such as electrode coating machines, pole piece cutting machines, and module packaging machines as restricted export items. This is the first time China has implemented "technology-level" reviews in the field of new energy manufacturing equipment. The policy is not a blockade but a reminder - some technologies are not just products; they are related to the lifeblood of the industry.
From the governance of the rare earth industry to the export control of lithium battery equipment, China's regulatory logic is quietly evolving: from "controlling resources" to "controlling technologies"; from "guarding mines" to "guarding processes." This is exactly the inspiration that the photovoltaic industry urgently needs to draw.
01 The Export Control of Lithium Battery Equipment Aims at Advanced Solid-State Battery Technologies
On October 9, 2025, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs of China jointly issued an announcement, deciding to implement export control on related items such as lithium batteries and artificial graphite anode materials starting from November 8, 2025, which involves a variety of lithium battery equipment. According to the announcement, the lithium battery equipment subject to control this time includes winding machines, stacking machines, electrolyte injection machines, hot presses, formation and capacity grading systems, and capacity grading cabinets used for manufacturing rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.
The author immediately thought of Lead Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. The company's public introduction shows that it provides lithium battery manufacturing equipment and whole-line solutions. Its main products include: new slurry mixing systems, coating equipment, rolling (cutting) integrated equipment, die-cutting equipment, winding equipment, stacking (cutting and stacking integrated, thermal composite stacking) equipment, battery cell assembly production lines, formation and capacity grading test systems, magnetron sputtering coating machines, dry process technology equipment, electrolyte membrane preparation, lithium metal anode preparation, densification equipment, etc.
In response to this, Lead Intelligent Equipment stated, "The overall impact is relatively small. At present, the company's overseas orders mainly follow domestic customers going overseas, and this part will not be subject to control. Moreover, for sensitive overseas regions and sensitive customers, we generally won't do business with them anyway, and we've always followed this principle. According to yesterday's notice, it's just control, not a ban on exports. If we want to export, we just need to apply normally, and we've also had similar requirements before and have always applied for permits normally. Additionally, most of the orders this year are domestic orders."
The author pays more attention to the photovoltaic industry, and there is a relatively high overlap between lithium battery equipment and photovoltaic equipment enterprises. Enterprises engaged in lithium battery equipment production have more or less participated in the production of photovoltaic equipment when the photovoltaic market was booming. In fact, the production equipment required for these two industries is completely different.
Although both belong to the "New Three Exports," we don't have the same dominant position in the lithium battery and lithium battery equipment fields as we do in the photovoltaic and photovoltaic equipment fields.
In the lithium battery equipment field, in addition to Chinese enterprises such as Lead Intelligent Equipment, Hangke Technology Co., Ltd., Yinghe Technology Co., Ltd., and Liyuanheng Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd., there are also some foreign enterprises, such as CKD from Japan and PNT from South Korea. After all, there are well-known lithium battery enterprises overseas such as LG, Panasonic, and Tesla.
However, in terms of the technical strength of battery equipment, China is definitely the strongest. Only Chinese enterprises can truly achieve the integrated ability of providing whole-line and complete sets of equipment, while taking into account cost and local services.
Of course, an important reason why overseas equipment enterprises are not competitive is that Chinese equipment manufacturers have developed too rapidly in recent years, with obvious advantages in price and delivery speed.
Lead Intelligent Equipment stated in its 2024 annual report: "In 2024, the company promoted the global energy transformation with intelligent manufacturing capabilities. According to the data statistics of Frost & Sullivan, in terms of the order value in 2024, Lead Intelligent Equipment is the world's largest provider of new energy intelligent equipment and solutions, occupying 9.1% of the global market share, an increase of 3.3 percentage points compared with 2023. Among them, the intelligent equipment for lithium batteries occupies 22.4% of the global market share and 34.1% of the Chinese market share; the intelligent logistics equipment for lithium batteries occupies 23.8% of the global market share."
Hangke Technology occupies a relatively large market share in the lithium battery formation and capacity grading equipment market, approximately 35%.
Overseas business is the focus of these enterprises.
Yinghe Technology reported in its 2024 annual report that during the reporting period, it received orders from many leading customers such as Guoxuan High-Tech Co., Ltd. and EVE Energy Co., Ltd. Its products are exported to many countries such as Germany, South Korea, France, the United States, Canada, Spain, and Malaysia. The company's market share of lithium battery equipment still maintains a leading position, and its market competitiveness is constantly improving.
According to the data statistics from WIND, the proportion of overseas business of each enterprise has been increasing to varying degrees in the past two years. This is also a new business growth point.
Image source: WIND
However, some of these lithium battery equipment are sold to purely foreign-funded enterprises, while others go overseas with Chinese lithium battery enterprises; some lithium battery equipment is exported from within China, while some may come from the overseas production bases of Chinese lithium battery equipment manufacturers.
This time, the purpose of the export control of lithium battery equipment is to target the leading lithium battery production technologies and maintain China's dominant position in the lithium battery field. J.P. Morgan released a research report stating that China's control this time is not a comprehensive ban but a targeted category control to balance industrial security and global cooperation. This control has a clear "foresight" and is mainly targeted at the semi-solid battery field. In the future, the export of equipment for the purpose of obtaining China's lithium battery technology is likely to be stopped.
Especially, some enterprises provide customers with an integrated intelligent factory overall solution of "intelligent manufacturing + service"; especially now that the advanced solid-state battery technology and solid-state battery equipment have just made breakthrough progress. It would be extremely unwise and short-sighted to give away the technology to overseas partners in the form of equipment exports.
02 To Prevent Technology Leakage, Should We Focus on Controlling the "Shovel Sellers"?
The author has been thinking about a question in recent months. If we work together to reduce production capacity, we may "eliminate" and scrap our domestic photovoltaic production capacity - even many of the production capacities were newly built in the past one or two years and are not outdated. However, what should we do if the overseas photovoltaic production capacity is rising rapidly at the same time?
In this way, will we end up giving away the huge market after the anti-involution efforts? Especially when the rising production capacity is concentrated in countries that are not very friendly to us? In the end, our industry may "lose weight," while overseas factories "gain muscle," and this self-rescue may turn into a strategic concession. Especially when these new production capacities are concentrated in countries that are not friendly to China, the problem is not just economic competition but the reconstruction of industrial security.
With the ebb of domestic investment enthusiasm and the intensification of price wars, the orders of photovoltaic equipment manufacturers have plummeted. The compressed profits force them to turn their attention overseas - especially to India.
In April 2022, Singapore Maiwei, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Maiwei Co., Ltd., signed an agreement with India's Reliance Industries Group to supply 8 whole production lines of heterojunction (HJT) batteries with a total production capacity of 4.8GW and a contract value of approximately 1.5 billion yuan. This order was equivalent to half of Maiwei's revenue in the previous year. Two years later, when investors asked about the project progress in the annual report, the company only gave a vague response of "Please pay attention to the publicly disclosed information."
Almost at the same time, Shengcheng Photovoltaic, a subsidiary of Jingshan Light Machine Co., Ltd., also signed a contract with Reliance to supply 5.2GW of component production line equipment. Shengcheng even established a technical service center in India to provide full-cycle support from installation, commissioning to maintenance.
In the Indian market, the "shovel sellers" have become the new protagonists. However, the problem is that the more advanced the shovels are, the more likely it is that our own gold mines will be dug out.
According to the latest data from the Indian Ministry of Energy, India's photovoltaic installed capacity has exceeded 116GW, achieving the target set in the Paris Agreement for 2030 five years ahead of schedule. More notably, India's photovoltaic manufacturing capacity is growing at an astonishing speed - it was only 2.3GW in 2014 and has now exceeded 100GW.
This explosive growth is inseparable from the Indian government's "PLI Production Linked Incentive Scheme": Enterprises that set up factories in India to produce photovoltaic components, batteries, and silicon wafers can receive dual support of financial subsidies and market access; combined with high import tariffs and the "Approved List of Models and Manufacturers" (ALMM system), it forms a complete industrial barrier.
As a result, India has rapidly transformed from a simple "assembly country" to a "manufacturing country." In March 2025, the Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy announced that starting from 2026, only batteries produced using non-diffused black silicon wafers can be recognized as "Made in India." In other words, the core process of battery production must be completed locally.
On the surface, this is a policy to protect the local industry; in essence, it is a precise replacement strategy for the Chinese manufacturing link. India lacks not policies or capital but technology and equipment. And precisely in these two aspects, Chinese enterprises have become the largest suppliers.
According to the calculations of securities institutions, the demand for photovoltaic equipment in India from 2024 to 2026 is approximately 1.38 billion yuan, of which 85% will be provided by Chinese enterprises. In other words, India's 100GW production capacity is built with "Chinese equipment."
Although it is well-known, the author still wants to list the four major players in the photovoltaic equipment field here.
Silicon material production equipment: Shuangliang Eco-Energy Systems Co., Ltd. is an important enterprise in the field of silicon material production equipment. Its polysilicon reduction furnace has a market share of over 65%, holding an absolute leading position in the industry. Shuangliang's polysilicon reduction furnaces are selling well overseas.
Silicon wafer production equipment: Jingsheng Electric Co., Ltd. is the leading enterprise in silicon wafer production equipment. Its single crystal furnace has a global market share of over 50% and is technologically advanced. In addition, Gaoce Co., Ltd. has a global market share of over 40% in the field of silicon wafer slicing machines, ranking first in market share. Technological breakthroughs have promoted the thinning of silicon wafers (below 120μm).
Battery production equipment: Jiejia Weichuang Co., Ltd. is a leading enterprise in battery production equipment, with an overall market share of over 60%, especially ranking first in the market share of TOPCon coating equipment. Maiwei Co., Ltd. is also an important enterprise in the field of battery production equipment, and its screen printing machine is globally leading.
Component production equipment: Aotewi Co., Ltd. is the king in the field of string welding machines for component production, with a global market share of over 80%.
What is worrying is not only the equipment enterprises. Recently, it is rumored that a new silicon wafer enterprise in Yunnan, although not producing photovoltaic equipment itself, can only earn some money by selling "shovels" due to poor business operations. It directly helps India build silicon wafer production capacity, brings complete photovoltaic technology, commissions equipment, and trains personnel. Isn't this equivalent to "teaching" India the technology hand in hand?
As the anti-involution efforts in the Chinese photovoltaic industry progress, it cannot rely solely on the meetings of the Photovoltaic Industry Association and various initiatives from leading enterprises. There are still many areas worth looking forward to - such as the export control of key equipment and key technologies.
From our experience in controlling rare earths, the first step in industrial security is to control the visible and invisible parts of exports. The reason why rare earth smuggling has become a key area for governance is that those seemingly insignificant gray channels have ultimately forced the entire industry into low-price competition.
Today, photovoltaic products, including photovoltaic equipment, actually have similar "trade laundering" behaviors as China's rare earth exports in the past. It is understandable for photovoltaic products to do so in response to unfair trade policies. However, similar behaviors regarding photovoltaic equipment need to be highly valued.
When whole production line equipment, commissioning software, remote services, and technical training are exported in a package, it is essentially an invisible technology spillover. The whole production line services provided by enterprises such as Maiwei, Shengcheng, and Lead Intelligent Equipment in India and Southeast Asia not only include hardware equipment but also involve the optimization of process parameters, the update of software algorithms, and even the optimization of production line yields - these are all the core competitiveness of the industry.
Once these capabilities are replicated, the so-called "technological generation gap" will quickly disappear.
India's goal is very clear: to achieve 100% local production of silicon wafers, batteries, and components by 2030. In the short term, they rely on Chinese equipment; in the medium term, they will achieve independent upgrading on this basis. By then, Indian photovoltaic products will not only be able to replace imports but also compete directly with Chinese enterprises in the international market at a lower cost.
By then, the anti-involution efforts in the photovoltaic industry will return to the starting point again - we have eliminated the redundant domestic production capacity but rebuilt a larger competitor overseas.
03 How to Make Technology "Go Overseas with a Lock"?
Based on the experience of other industries, the author has the following suggestions:
First, technology must "go overseas with a lock."
The key to the successful governance of the rare earth industry lies in the "lock." Locking the export channels, locking the price system, and locking the industry rhythm.
For the photovoltaic industry, this "lock" is not in the mines but in the technology.
In the past, the opening-up was comprehensive: equipment, processes, and services were exported in a package. However, in the future, the opening-up must be hierarchical: the export of core equipment requires a permit; the whole production line services need to be filed; and the key software algorithms and remote commissioning need to leave a record on the domestic server.
Enterprises have every reason to go overseas, but the country must know what they are taking overseas.
A feasible approach is to establish a "review system for the export of photovoltaic manufacturing equipment," using the review of lithium battery equipment as a template, listing a "list of key equipment," including core links such as high-precision slicing machines, coating furnaces, automatic detection lines, and MES control systems, and implementing classified management.
This is not to restrict enterprises from making money but to ensure that the profits from going overseas do not come at the cost of technology leakage.
Second, prevent "service-based exports" from becoming a channel for technology transfer.
Compared with hardware exports, service exports are more hidden and difficult to supervise. The "technical service center" established by Shengcheng Photovoltaic in India seems to be for after-sales support on the surface, but in essence, it is an incubator for technology replication.
In the future review system, models such as "turnkey projects," "whole production line commissioning," and "comprehensive training" should be included in the scope of supervision. Enterprises should be required to report detailed technology lists and training contents and conduct data filing. This system design is not a hostile prevention but a necessary step in modern industrial governance.
Just as the South Korean government "red-flagged" LG Chem's cathode material project, the reason is not to protect the enterprise's interests but to protect the country's strategic technology security.
Third, while combating involution, we must firmly hold on to the right to advance photovoltaic technology.
Anti-involution should not only be about eliminating backward production capacity but more importantly, preventing the dilution of leading technologies.
Once the core equipment and processes become the cornerstone of other countries' manufacturing systems, China's leading advantage in the photovoltaic industry will be "equalized." By then, no matter how the domestic supply-side production capacity is restructured, it will be difficult to regain the initiative.
The supply-side reform in the rare earth industry shows us that only when the state intervenes can the market return to rationality. After the strict review of rare earth exports and the thorough cleanup of smuggling, the rare earth prices gradually recovered, and enterprises had the profits to reinvest in research and development.
The photovoltaic equipment industry also needs similar "institutional barriers." Otherwise, the so-called "market self-regulation" may ultimately just be another name for technology loss.
Fourth, clarify the boundaries between opening-up and control.
Of course, the internationalization of China's photovoltaic industry is an established direction. Completely blocking equipment exports is not only unrealistic but also harmful to enterprises' global layout. The key lies in finding a balance between opening-up and control.
Feasible approaches include:
Establish a "whitelist of trusted partners" and allow conditional exports to trusted countries and regions;
Require enterprises to keep key modules for domestic production and only export semi-finished products or low-generation equipment;
Encourage enterprises to shift from single sales to "controlled services," such as remote monitoring and authorized upgrades, so that the technology rights still remain in China.
This mechanism of "going overseas with a lock" can enable enterprises to participate in the global market while safeguarding the bottom line of industrial security.
Epilogue
China's leading position in the photovoltaic industry is not just about cost advantages but the ability of the entire industrial chain to work together: silicon materials, batteries, components, equipment, algorithms, capital, and the market. This huge system supports each other and is indispensable.
When we reflect on the experience of the rare earth and lithium battery equipment industries, what the photovoltaic industry really needs to learn is not "restricting exports" itself but the national governance logic behind it: let the market play a decisive role in resource allocation, and let the system play a protective role at key nodes.
The experience and lessons of the rare earth industry tell us that unrestricted opening-up will ultimately lead to the loss of initiative; the actions in the lithium battery industry are telling us that we should not hesitate when it's time to set up defenses.
The future of the photovoltaic industry requires both the courage to go global and the wisdom to safeguard our interests.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Hangzhou Qiantang Enterprise Overseas Service Base". Author: Gan Tan Hao. Republished with permission from Qiantang.
